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Reform of the fixing mechanism for the purchase price
for Malian cotton farmers and its consequences in the
context of falling world prices1
Kako NUBUKPO 
and Manda Sadio KEITA*
Introduction
Faced with unfair competition internationally from massively subsidised production
and dumping originating in Northern countries, notably the USA and the European
Union, the African countries that instigated the Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton,
accompanied by others, have vigorously denounced these trade-distorting practices,
which are at odds with the neo-liberal discourse of the offending governments.2
Cotton is amongst the few products for which African countries in the CFA franc
zone have seen an increase in their share of export markets. However, the mechanisms
for determining the purchase price for the producers of this cotton are far from 
transparent: the price is defined in relation to other prices that are invisible to most
agents, including the anticipated price on the international markets, and costs and 
margins for marketing and processing by cotton companies.3 Moreover, in a context of
the liberalisation of cotton industries, both the price level and the method for determining
the producer price are increasingly transferring uncertainty and risk in the cotton 
sector onto the farmer, thus increasing his vulnerability.4 Furthermore, the strong
dependency of West African economies on cotton means that shocks affecting the cotton
industry are immediately transmitted to the economy as a whole, via transmission
channels well known to economic theory.5
* Kako NUBUKPO is an economist for CIRAD, Department of Policy and Market Research, based with
the Cotton Programme of the IER in Bamako, Mali. Manda Sadio KEITA is an economist for the IER,
Network Economy Programme, Bamako, Mali. 
1 This article arises from a study financed by the NGO Oxfam Great Britain (Oxfam GB), West Africa
Regional Management Centre, and carried out by the authors. As well as the remarks made by participants
at a workshop held on 5 July 2005 in Bamako, the authors have also benefited from written remarks by
Sally Baden, Eric Hazard, Louis Goreux and Tom Bassett, to whom they extend their thanks. The authors
of course remain solely responsible for the opinions expressed, as well as for any errors or omissions that
may remain in this article.
2 Nubukpo, 2004; Pesche and Nubukpo, 2004.
3 Araujo-Bonjean and Brun, 2001.
4 Araujo-Bonjean and Boussard, 1999; Nubukpo, 2000.
5 Abbott and McCalla, 2002; Timmer, 2002.
For cotton industries, this state of affairs is particularly worrying due to the 
considerable instability of the global cotton price (Cotlook Index A). Subject on the
one hand to volatility resulting from the imbalances of supply and demand in the 
global market and, on the other, to the instability arising from fluctuations in exchange
rates between the US dollar and the CFA franc, cotton prices have become increasingly
unpredictable since the beginning of the 1970s. Some writers have observed that
“major changes in price tend to be followed by other large-scale changes; in other
words the volatility of prices is serially correlated”, while there is also a widening of
the range over which prices fluctuate.6 And these writers conclude that “liberalisation
of the cotton industries in the CFA franc zone of Africa is taking place in a particularly
unfavourable context: the expected returns from exports are relatively low compared
[with] the 1960s, but the risks involved are more and more substantial.”
The subsidies allocated by Northern countries (essentially the EU and the USA) to
their farmers are one factor that is regularly cited to explain the persistent decline in
world cotton prices. In the specific case of Mali, a study by Adjovi, Wetta and Sanogo
(2004) reveals the negative impact of EU and US subsidies on the Malian economy for
the year 2001.7 In the opinion of these authors, “it appears that world cotton prices
determine at once the level of cotton production in Mali, the price for the producer and
agricultural income. However, the impact of world prices is much less significant on
the generation of value added by the farm enterprise.” Northern country subsidies
exert an impact on the Malian economy on at least two levels:
• Via the classic channel of reducing world cotton prices and, consequently, the
export receipts for Mali, which is a “price taker” on the international market;
• Via the modification of the rules by which the cotton purchase price for the 
producer is determined, which in turn affects the distribution within the sector of
the value added generated.
This article aims to analyse in greater detail the second channel, which to date has
received less attention than the first, but which is likely to have a considerable impact
on the living conditions of cotton producers.
The Malian example is particularly significant in that, following the fall in international
cotton prices, and taking into account the large deficit of the CMDT (Compagnie
Malienne de Développement des Fibres Textiles, which has a monopoly on the purchase
of cottonseed), a new mechanism for determining the purchase price of cottonseed
from the producer was adopted in January 2005. The adoption of this mechanism led
to a lowering of the minimum guaranteed price, from FCFA 210 per kilo of “top grade”
cotton in 2004/05, to a price range of between FCFA 160 and FCFA 175 per kilo, 
starting from the 2005/06 growing season. It also led to the effective end of the guaranteed
minimum price system.
6 Araujo-Bonjean and Brun, 2001.
7 From a correlation matrix and elasticity calculations, the authors have obtained the following results: 
a direct fall in receipts of 1.6 per cent for the public treasury, a decrease by 1.8 per cent in global revenue,
an elasticity of 0.3 between poverty indicators and world prices; an elasticity of 0.87 between cotton 
revenue and poverty indicators. 
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The lower end of this price range is, according to the available data, lower than the
average cost of production per kilo of cottonseed, and thus raises the issue of what
adjustments will be made by farmers, and by the Malian cotton industry as a whole, to
ensure the viability of production in the short and medium terms.
The aim of this article is to analyse the expected impact on the Malian cotton industry
and economy of the implementation of the new fixing mechanism for the price paid 
to Malian cotton farmers, taking into account production costs and also the ongoing
institutional changes within the industry (i.e. planned privatisation of the CMDT and
the transfer of new responsibilities to farmers’ organisations). This work is based on
surveys done in the cotton-growing zones of Mali and the creation and use of a social
accounting matrix for the country as a whole.
The first section of the article presents the new purchase price mechanism for 
cottonseed for the producer (section 1), before analysing its microeconomic impacts
(section 2) and macroeconomic impacts (section 3), and finally drawing some 
conclusions and making some recommendations.
The new price mechanism for purchasing cottonseed from the farmer
In January 2005, the Malian government, the state cotton company CMDT and the
cotton farmers’ unions signed a protocol on a new mechanism for fixing the purchase
price of cottonseed. This new agreement brings about a radical change in the base price
of Malian cotton, which will henceforth be directly linked to the international price
(Cotlook Index A), rather than being derived essentially from production costs. This
change comes at a time when the industry is facing major difficulties in terms of
CMDT’s financial balance. At the same time, input costs are increasing and yields 
are declining in many cotton-growing areas, while the support funds to underwrite the
new price mechanism do not yet exist.
The old mechanism
The mechanism applied in Mali for determining the purchase price per kilo of 
cottonseed before the January 2005 reform was based on bipartite negotiations
between the CMDT and representatives of producer organisations. This mechanism
suffered from the practical difficulty of differentiating the minimum guaranteed price
from the initial price offered to farmers. However, in practice, its implementation
allowed producers to obtain an initial price of FCFA 200 per kilo and a definitive campaign
price of FCFA 210 per kilo for “top grade” cottonseed in 2004/05. Moreover, the 
old mechanism implicitly recognised that the initial price would be higher than the
minimum price and, in turn, that the definitive price would be higher than the initial
price. However, the Malian government, under pressure from the donor community
and fearing for the long-term sustainability of supporting the cotton industry deficit
and the repercussions of the CMDT’s financial problems, accepted demands to re-open
negotiations on the mechanism for determining the cottonseed purchase price.  
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The new mechanism   
The Malian government opted for a new mechanism to determine the purchase
price of cottonseed for the producer, which resulted in a drastic revision downwards
of the guaranteed minimum price. It fell from FCFA 210 per kilo to FCFA 160-175 per
kilo from the start of the 2005/06 season. Furthermore, two articles in the protocol
signed by the Malian government, the CMDT and the producers (represented by the
GSCVM8) seem particularly important, as they introduce new elements into the
process for determining the price paid to producers. 
In this protocol, which was initiated by the World Bank in a Memorandum dated
14 November 2004 (Technical Monitoring Mission for the SAC IV Program)  and 
subsequently adopted by the Malian government, a specific innovation is Article 
8, which states that in case of force majeure, the signatories to the protocol can decide
on a reduction in the purchase price of cotton, which could therefore fall below the
lower limit of the agreed price range, i.e. below FCFA 160/kg. This article assumes 
a particular significance when read in conjunction with Article 2, which states that 
the new pricing mechanism “must be implemented whether the support fund be 
subscribed to or not” i.e. that the support fund intended as a guarantee to the effective
functioning of the new price mechanism is in no way a prerequisite to its application. 
Currently, the creation of a support fund is under study and a consultant’s report
commissioned by the MRSC9 is expected. The protocol also states that, every three years,
the price range is to be revised in agreement by the various parties. Finally, Articles 
4 and 5 set out, respectively, the ways of dividing the industry’s revenues between 
the CMDT and farmers, and the methods for determining the final remuneration paid
to cotton farmers.
In the context of this balance of power, which is unfavourable to cotton farmers, an
objective evaluation is needed of the likely micro- and macroeconomic consequences
of the application of the new cotton price mechanism, taking into account underlying
trends in cotton production costs.
Macroeconomic impacts (impacts microéconomiques)
Production costs in the cotton-growing zone of Mali 
The farms that were the subject of the study were classified according to the typology
described below (A, B, C and D) and used by CMDT in the cotton-growing zone of Mali:
•  A farm of type A is one that is equipped with at least two pairs of ploughing oxen,
a plough, a multi-cultivator, a seed drill, a cart (either donkey- or ox-cart) and a
herd of at least six head of cattle over and above the working oxen. These farms
have at least two ploughing units (two pairs of working oxen and two ploughs
and/or multi-cultivators);
8 ‘‘Groupement des syndicats cotonniers et vivriers du Mali’’ (Group of Cotton and Food-Producing
Unions of Mali).
9 ‘‘Mission de Restructuration du Secteur Coton’’ (Cotton Sector Restructuring Mission).
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•  A type B farm has one ploughing unit at its disposal;
•  A type C farm has one incomplete ploughing unit, but has experience of plough
cultivation;
•  A type D farm is one that has no equipment and where all the work is done manually..
Table 1 shows the distribution of the different types of agricultural production unit
(APU) in the study zone: 
Table 1: Distribution of farms by type
Type Pourcentage
Type A 34,9
Type B 46,3
Type C 10,3
Type D 8,5
TOTAL 100
Source: CAMFPGP,10 growing season 2003/04
Table 2 gives an overview of cotton production costs per hectare, according to the
APU type. 
The main difficulty in determining cottonseed production costs lies in fixing 
the cost of daily farm labourers’ wages. The daily wage rate used in this study is 
FCFA 750, which corresponds to the estimates of researchers from ESPGRN/IER11
in Sikasso, following group discussions with producers in November 2004, and is in
line with current practice in the cotton-growing areas of Mali.12
10 ‘‘Commission d’Application du Mécanisme de Fixation du Prix du Coton Graine aux Producteurs’’
(Commission for the Application of the Cottonseed Price Fixing Mechanism for Producers). 
11 Keïta et al., 2004.
12 This daily wage is also the one used by the HORUS-SERNES study, 2002.
Reform of the fixing mechanism for the purchase price for Malian 113
Table 2: Overview of cotton production costs per hectare, according to APU 
type (all costs in CFAF)
Rubrique/Type UPA Type A Type B Type C Type D Average
Average area (hectares) 5,41 3,16 0,73 0,48 2,45
Allowance for depreciation (1) 25764 25955 17664 8544 19482
Salaried labour 6750 3750 6750 0 4313
Family labour 71250 75000 59250 75750 70313
Total 119997 103674 72999 35362 83008
Cottoseed 
yield per ha (kg) 1127,35 1108,86 859,31 621,33 929,21
Cotton fibre 
yield per ha (kg) 473,49 465,72 360,91 260,96 390,27
Cost per kilogram 
of cotton (2) 106,44 93,50 84,95 56,91 85,45
Cost per kilogram 
of cotton (3) 169,64 161,13 153,90 178,83 165,88
(1) Annual payment per hectare calculated according to a linear depreciation of material and
equipment, converted into per hectare terms.
(2) Cost without family labour.
(3) Cost with family labour.
Source: estimations by the authors based on SEP/ESPGRN/IER Sikasso data and monitoring
by CMDT. It should be noted that these results only cover the 2003/04 season.
Farms of type C and type D, which cultivate less than one hectare of cotton on average,
tend to specialise in cereal production (with more than three hectares of cultivated area
on average). They grow cotton only in order to take advantage of cotton inputs from
the CMDT, which are then used for their cereal crops. Furthermore, they have yields
that are markedly lower than those of farm types A and B. This is due to the fact that,
being unequipped or poorly equipped, they begin production later, in order to make
use of equipment and labour once the type A and type B farms have finished their 
operations. This means that the dates for ploughing and hoeing recommended by 
agricultural extension services are not respected. Moreover, farmers on type C and
type D farms perform paid services for farmers of type A and type B when the latter
are carrying out their ploughing and hoeing. All this has a negative effect on yields on
farms of types C and D. 
Bearing in mind these production costs and the decreasing yields in Mali’s cotton-
growing zone,13 the reduction of cottonseed prices for the producer from FCFA 210/kg
to FCFA 160-175/kg raises some questions, specifically: 
-  Will the new price range allow producers, on average, to make a profit?
-  How will farmers respond to the adverse price trend?
13 Nubukpo and Keita, 2005.
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The new price fixing mechanism and the profitability of cotton growing 
Calculations of production costs for Malian cotton converge around a range of
FCFA 154 to FCFA 179 per kilo of top-grade cotton, with an average of FCFA 166/kg.
Thus, the application of the range defined by the new price mechanism runs the risk
that farmers will be operating at a zero or negative margin because the purchase price
will be, for the most part, lower than the production costs. The general situation of the
industry tends to reinforce this forecast. The Malian cotton sector is suffering from a
weakening of support to farmers by the CMDT,14 a rapid rise in prices of cotton inputs
(a consequence of the reduction in subsidies granted by the CMDT) and falling cotton
yields. In this regard, the only conceivable rationalisation of production costs lies in a
reduction of returns to the labour force. This is worrying, given official commitments
to poverty reduction. 
The real problem in evaluating production costs lies in the estimation of family
labour costs. This has long been the major point of disagreement between producers
and the CMDT in fixing prices for producers, even under the old mechanism. In Mali,
production is centred essentially on family labour, which in turn is at the root of the
fragmentation of farms in the cotton zone. While the majority of farms use paid labour
(see Table 3), this labour is mainly hired on a casual, task-specific basis.. 
Table 3: Percentage of cotton farms using paid labour
Use of paid labour Percentage 
Yes 79
No 21
TOTAL 100
Source: CAMFPGP, growing season 2003/04
Paid labour is hired mainly during hoeing (up to 26 per cent) and during the cotton
harvest (60 per cent). Thus, a potential decrease in farmers’ incomes would have a 
negative impact on both operations. Hoeing is essential to ensure a good yield, while
extra labour at harvest-time guarantees a better quality of cottonseed (by preventing
last-minute pest attacks).
14 The current trend is for a “re-centring” of the CMDT’s management solely on activities linked to 
cotton marketing.
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Response of Malian cotton farmers to falling prices 
Within the framework of the January 2005 IER/CMDT study group, which looked
at the reasons behind declining yields in the cotton-growing zones of Mali, the 
sub-group on socio-economic aspects identified some foreseeable elements of the
impact on producers of a decrease in the price of cotton, through interviews carried out
with a sample of farmers in the cotton-growing areas. Farmers’ motivations for 
continuing to produce cotton and their likely responses to decreasing prices, confirmed
during interviews carried out in the framework of the Oxfam study, are particularly
interesting.
Four main reasons were put forward by producers to explain their interest in 
continuing in cotton production, despite the difficulties encountered:
•  The benefits of monetary income in the context of a minimum guaranteed purchasing
price for cottonseed;
•  Access to different kinds of credit, which are generally granted on the basis of
guarantees linked to cotton production;
•  The positive knock-on effects of growing cotton in year ‘N’ on the yields of cereal
crops in year ‘N+1’; 
•  The great instability in prices of cereals, giving rise to uncertainty in incomes
derived from cereal production.
Regarding the first motive, the producers clearly indicated their interest in the 
security offered by cotton-growing in terms of income stability, due to the guaranteed
purchase price system for cottonseed, the guaranteed market for cotton and the relative
rapidity in payment to growers by the CMDT. 
Furthermore, cotton production provides indispensable collateral for access to credit
in the CMDT zone, for inputs and equipment or for consumption, in terms of BNDA
(Banque Nationale de Développement Agricole) loans or simply in terms of micro credit.
The second reason for persevering with cotton production seems a determinant factor
in understanding the rationale for farming practices in the cotton zone. For example, the
input credits given for cotton can also be used for cereal production. Farmers are wholly
dependent on the cotton industry for access to credit and this engenders perverse
effects, as some farmers admit. Performance in terms of improved cotton yields is not
always the primary objective of the farmers, notably the less well-equipped ones;
rather, what keeps them in cotton production are the benefits from their membership
of the “cotton club”, particularly access to credit which allows them to produce cereals,
thus ensuring food self-sufficiency. 
The pertinence of this reasoning is underlined by the third motive – the knock-on
effects of cotton production on cereal yields. Indeed, the use of chemical or organic
inputs and the preparation and rigorous maintenance of the soil that is required by 
cotton production give rise, during crop rotation, to soils with higher fertility, which in
turn means good cereal yields. 
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The final motive put forward by producers is the instability of cereal prices.
Ironically, the better the harvest and the higher the volume of cereals marketed, the
lower the prices become. The producers are wary of this cereal price instability, and it
seems that cereal production serves less to generate monetary income than to ensure
food self-sufficiency for rural households.
Overall, cotton producers are obviously unhappy about the fall in the initial price
for cottonseed. However, for the most part, they have restated their intention to grow
cotton, despite the decrease announced in the price, and to adapt themselves to this 
situation. 
One of the responses envisaged by producers is a future reduction in cotton acreage.15
This response seems logical since, in addition, the costs of inputs, particularly those of
fertilisers and phytosanitary products, have been continuously rising. This perspective
is not, however, unanimously shared. Recent decisions by the competent authorities
suggest that farmers can count on a fall of 6 per cent in the cost of inputs, following
decisions taken in this regard by the relevant authorities. In view of this, in some 
villages the trend seems to be rather to move towards an increase in land planted to
cotton. This willingness of producers to increase their production acreage nevertheless
runs up against the problem of land pressure, as well as that of a lack of family 
labour and/or the cost of external labour. They have minimal room for manoeuvre on
remuneration for labour. For these reasons, some cotton producers do not rule out
being forced to sell some of their livestock to meet repayments of input credits, if 
the current trend should continue. Similarly, an extension of the acreage planted to
cereals has been envisaged by some producers as a possible response to the fall in 
cotton prices, due to the amount of work that cotton-growing demands. 
To conclude, the price level seems less important than the minimum guaranteed
price as a factor in whether or not producers decide to grow cotton. The price level has
a greater impact on decisions regarding the acreage sown respectively with cotton and
cereals.
However, it should be stressed that too wide a gap between the initial price and the
final price paid to producers would be likely to undermine farmers’ decisions, in so far
as the initial price is announced in April of year N, before planting, while the final
price is paid in July of year N+1, a good while after the harvest. One current argument
that is employed in defence of the mechanism for determining the purchase price of
cottonseed is that the initial price is much less relevant to the farmer than the higher
final price. While this protects the CMDT in the case of a reversal in world markets,
it underestimates the income shortfall in terms of lost cotton production (and export
receipts) for Mali, which might arise from the announcement of a price that acts 
as a disincentive for the producers. It would be preferable to minimise the gap between
the initial price and the final price, in order to optimise cotton production levels and
thereby facilitate forecasts that are both viable and stable for the producers.
15 This option has also been accepted in the conclusions of the DNSI study (2003), which estimated 
a reduction in acreage of between 10 per cent and 25 per cent and a decrease in cotton production of 
25 per cent for a fixed purchase price of FCFA 160 per kilo of cotton.
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Macroeconomic impacts 
To estimate the macroeconomic impacts of the decrease in cottonseed prices, several
scenarios have been tested, on the basis of data extracted from a social accounting matrix.
The different scenarios are based on hypotheses of the prices for producers and the price
elasticity of supply.
Scenarios of decrease in price for the cotton producer, and their impacts 
Scenario 1: Impacts of applying a price for the producer of FCFA 160/kg, with no
change in the volume of production
By doing a simulation of the effects of fixing the price of cotton for the producer at
CFCA 160/kg i.e. a 24 per cent reduction in the price for the growing season 2004/05,
the following results were obtained from a social accounting matrix.
In terms of effects, all else being equal, the loss of revenue for producers would be
in the range of FCFA 29.5 billion.16 Supposing that this reduction results in a decrease
in consumer spending by households, the secondary effects on the Malian economy
would be the following: 
•  A decrease in income for other households (non-cotton growing) of FCFA 18 billion;
•  A decrease in imports of FCFA 4.8 billion, leading to a decrease in the state’s
receipts, in terms of various taxes, of around FCFA 3.3 billion; 
•  A loss of revenue for industry of FCFA 11.3 billion.
For the Malian economy as a whole, the probable loss suffered following a 
fixing of the purchasing price for cottonseed at FCFA 160/kg is estimated at FCFA
62.32 billion, which is the equivalent of a reduction in GDP of 1.86 per cent. 
Scenario 2: Impacts of a reduction in cotton production of 25 per cent, following
the application of a price to the producer of FCFA 160/kg
Supposing that, following a decrease in the price for the producer of FCFA 50/kg,
producers respond by reducing cotton production by 25 per cent (hypothesis put 
forward by DNSI, 2003), total receipts from exports would diminish by FCFA
53 billion. This result is reached by supposing that the fibre is sold, at minimum, at the
CIF cost price of FCFA 858.48/kg.17
The secondary effects for the Malian economy of this downturn in cotton production
would be the following: 
•  The producers’ income would decrease by FCFA 36.8 billion, all other things being
equal; 
•  The income of other households (non-cotton growing) would decrease by FCFA
22.8 billion; 
•  Imports would go down to the tune of FCFA 5.9 billion; 
16 The annual production of cotton seed in Mali for the growing season 2004/05 being 589,562 tonnes
(source: CMDT/DPA, July 2005).
17 Cf. report by A. Wadell, 2005, Plan de sortie de crise.
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•  Following this decrease in imports, government fiscal receipts would decrease by
FCFA 4 billion; 
•  There would be a loss of revenue to industry of FCFA 14 billion.
Overall, in this scenario, the total losses for the Malian economy can be estimated
at FCFA 136.5 billion, i.e. a reduction in GDP of 3.9 per cent. 
Scenario 3: Impacts of applying a price for the producer of FCFA 175/kg 
If the price for the producer is fixed at FCFA 175/kg, without a downward adjustment
in production, the following repercussions can be expected for the Malian economy: 
•  A lowering in producer income of FCFA 20.6 billion; 
•  A loss in income for other households of FCFA 12.7 billion; 
•  A reduction in imports of FCFA 3.3 billion, leading to a loss of receipts for the state
in terms of port duties of FCFA 2.3 billion; 
•  A loss of revenue for businesses of FCFA 7.9 billion. 
The total loss anticipated for the Malian economy as a result of fixing the price to
the producer at FCFA 175/kg would be in the region of FCFA 43.6 billion, i.e. a reduction
in GDP of 1.3 per cent. 
Summarising the different scenarios tested, it is obvious that fixing the price for the
Malian cotton producer at FCFA 160/kg is likely to provoke negative repercussions that
are more than proportional for the Malian economy as a whole. These consequences
would be further aggravated if this price reduction were accompanied by a reduction
in cotton production, as a reaction from the producers. The loss of export receipts from
cotton are estimated at a minimum of FCFA 53 billion, for a price to the producer fixed
at FCFA 160/kg and a downward adjustment of 25 per cent in production. 
Indeed, the most recent official study available of the impact on the economy of a
price reduction for cotton18 estimates “the reduction in acreage as being between 10
and 25 per cent, and as 25 per cent the loss of cotton production for a purchase price
fixed at FCFA 160 per kilo of cotton”. It also estimates that “a reduction in prices by
10 per cent would bring about a decrease in cottonseed production of 5 per cent and
that would lead to a shortfall of FCFA 17.7 billion for the national economy. In the
instance where the loss of production reaches 50 per cent, as was the case in 2000/01,
the losses for the economy would rise to FCFA 113 billion”.
The negative impacts on the Malian economy are significantly reduced if producer
prices are maintained at a higher level. Indeed, with a price for the producer in the
region of FCFA 195/kg, the consequences for the national economy would be reduced
to a total loss of around FCFA 18.7 billion, which is almost the same as the deficit that  
18  DNSI, 2003
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the cotton industry recorded in November 2004. In other words, in attempting to
absorb the industry deficit of FCFA 18 billion by reducing the price to the producer to
a level below FCFA 195/kg, the losses generated for the economy as a whole risk being
greater than the initial deficit. It would seem clear therefore that, even though the need
for the Malian cotton industry to tackle the question of the world market price appears
justified in terms of the accumulated deficits of the industry, the fact remains that the
interests of the industry and of the economy as a whole seem to lie in supporting the
price to producers at a reasonable level.
Methods for further analysis of macroeconomic impacts
The use of a social accounting matrix for Mali permits an overall evaluation of the
probable impacts on the economy of a reduction in the purchase price of cottonseed.
However, to better understand this impact evaluation, it is necessary to have access 
to an econometric or calculable general equilibrium model that allows examination of
the channels by which this reduction could affect the four indicators traditionally used
by the International Monetary Fund in its performance reviews of macroeconomic
policies: i.e. real sector, table of government finance statistics (GFS), balance of 
payments and monetary situation. 
The effects at the real sector level are discussed above. Regarding the impact on 
the GFS table, the consequences of the decision to reduce the producer price can 
be grasped through its implications for the budget of the Malian government. Initially,
the budget will react positively to a reduction in the direct or indirect subsidies 
usually allocated in order to reduce the industry deficit. However, in the medium term,
a reduction of revenue from the industry could give rise to a loss in fiscal revenues.
Furthermore, a sustained rural exodus cannot be discounted, with the likely demands
that this will place on government social expenditures in urban areas. 
Equally, Mali’s trade balance could suffer from a reduction in the price to cotton
producers, due to the loss in production volume that could ensue. In all likelihood, 
cotton production levels should not significantly change for the 2005/06 growing 
season. However, as of the 2006/07 season, it is highly probable that the price elasticity
of supply will change, with the consequences that Scenario 2 has tried to quantify. 
As regards the monetary situation, which is directly linked to the balance of payments,
if there is a decrease in cotton export receipts, this could translate into a decrease in
foreign exchange and therefore in currency reserves for the BCEAO (Central Bank 
of West African States) and WAEMU. A reduction in net external asset holdings, being
a component of the counterpart of money supply, could translate into a loss in the 
coverage rate of monetary emission, in the context where three of the eight WAEMU
countries (Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali) derive the majority of their foreign exchange
earnings from cotton exports. 
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Conclusion 
The analysis of the transmission effects of a reduction in the cotton purchasing
price on the Malian economy as a whole has been possible through the construction 
of a social accounting matrix. It is clear that the attempt to reduce the deficit in the 
cotton industry through a drastic cut in the price paid to the producer risks having
depressive effects on the Malian economy, the sum of which could prove to be higher
than the budgetary savings envisaged in the first instance, as has been shown in the
different scenarios envisaged.
Indeed, the justifications given for introducing the new price mechanism – on the
one hand, the need to link Malian cotton producers to the world market and, on the
other, the projection of a rapid reduction in the dual deficits of the CMDT and the
Malian government – seem to have overlooked the potentially negative effects linked
to the application of this mechanism.
Furthermore, the method of calculation for the range adopted needs to be clarified,
with particular regard to the commonly held rules for fixing prices. Even if we accept
that the new mechanism effectively aims to link the producer price to the global price,
thus sanctioning the liberalisation process of the industry, the fact that the world price
itself results from an imperfect and unfair working of the international cotton market
puts this liberal argument into perspective. On the contrary, the introduction of such a
mechanism, supported by the World Bank and validated by the Malian authorities,
could exacerbate the existence a dual power imbalance: in the first place, between the
cotton-growing countries of Africa, which are price takers on the global market, and
other countries that subsidise their producers (the EU, the USA, China, etc.); and, 
in the second, between Malian cotton growers and other stakeholders in the industry
(the CMDT, the state). 
In addition, the perspective of reducing the dual CMDT/government deficit is a
short-term one, based strictly on accounting preoccupations. This is in contradiction
with a closed economy approach, based on recognition of the multiplier effect of 
cotton.19 It goes without saying that the scale of this multiplier effect depends on the
possibilities available for financing the industry deficit. This means that the risk 
cannot be ignored of an “eviction effect” caused by the transfer of resources to cotton
from other sectors, particularly in a context where some donors increasingly favour
budget support, to the detriment of targeted aid to specific sectors.
Finally, due to the loss of income for cotton farmers and therefore for rural 
populations as a whole, the new pricing mechanism will probably contribute to a rise
in poverty levels in the cotton-growing areas of Mali. Such an observation is worrying
in view of the objectives that are officially sought by both the Malian authorities and
the Bretton Woods institutions – though both have nevertheless validated this new
mechanism. The search for greater coherence between, on the one hand, the desired
effects of policies and the decisions actually taken and, on the other, the various 
policies of the government (macroeconomic, sectoral, etc.) is essential if poverty is to
be reduced in Mali.
19  Hugon 2005
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The results obtained lead to the following recommendations: 
•  The range determined for the purchase price for cottonseed from the growers needs
to be revised. In particular, the lower limit should be increased, with the two-fold
concern of: a) taking into account the adverse effects on the whole of the Malian
economy due to the setting of an initial purchase price that does not take into 
production costs, and b) reducing the gap between the initial price and the final
price, thus guaranteeing a greater stability for producers and relative accuracy in
the drawing up of their production forecasts.
•  Article 8 in the text of the new mechanism, regarding the possibility of reducing
the initial price during the growing season, should be withdrawn. Removing the
minimum guaranteed price is likely to cause cotton to lose its stabilising role in an
environment that is otherwise full of risks, with potentially negative consequences
for the sustainability of the whole cotton production system.
•  A support fund should be created that could guarantee a purchase price for 
cottonseed for producers. This fund is particularly justified as it minimises the
adverse effects of a price to the producer that is too low and, in particular, too
unstable. It could be financed, over and above possible margins from the cotton
industry, by a national solidarity tax, since cotton is so important for Mali, or by
funds coming from international aid and, possibly, from emergency aid funds 
to the cotton industry, in line with the claims made at the WTO in the framework
of the Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton. 
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